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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
WTO member countries turn to import-restricting "trade remedy" instruments during both good and bad macroeconomic times. Nevertheless, the historical economic evidence finds a strong link between economic downturns associated with recessions and exchange rate shocks and an increase in use of policies such as antidumping and safeguards. The sudden onset and global nature of the current economic crisis has created concern that countries may dramatically increase their use of such trade remedy instruments beyond the "normal" underlying current of protectionism associated with the ongoing process of adjustment associated with the forces of globalization.
Newly available data tracking the global use of these trade remedy instruments does indicate a marked increase in WTO members' combined resort to these instruments beginning in 2008 that A number of countries have resorted to these instruments, including almost all of the Group of Twenty (G-20) that are members of the WTO. These countries have few alternatives for invoking new forms of potentially WTO-consistent import protection as many are constrained both by the rules of the international system and because their pre-crisis applied tariff rates may have been somewhat close to their tariff bindings legally submitted to the WTO. The use of these import-restricting instruments is increasingly affecting "South-South" trade, i.e., developing country importers initiating and imposing new protectionist measures primarily affecting developing country exporters. The majority of the product-level actions to limit import competition intensively target exports from China.
Despite the increasing use of these instruments the amount of imports targeted by these measures thus far is relatively small. Collectively, the value of imports in 2007 for these major G-20 economies that has subsequently come under attack by the use of import-restricting trade remedies during the period of 2008 to early 2009 is likely less than $29 billion, or less than 0.45 per cent of these economies' total imports. With the exception of the concern raised by India's use (1.8 percent of its total 2007 imports) in particular, country-by-country estimates indicate that the new protectionism thus far covers only 0.2 to 0.8 per cent of these economies' total pre-crisis (2007) level of imports.
While the level of trade affected thus far may be small for most of these economies, a first assessment of some of the case-level data identifies many possible ways in which the crisis use of these import-restricting trade remedies may have economically important welfare-distorting effects. These potential losses go beyond the first order concern of the size of lost imports associated with targeted products and the losses to domestic consumers and using industries that suffer due to reduced access to imported varieties and higher prices. An established body of economic research identifies a number of unintended and adverse consequences associated with national resort to these trade remedies. We use this literature to guide our more detailed investigation of individual cases. We provide examples from crisis period cases in which firms may be using such remedies to generate anti-competitive effects imposing an additional burden on consumers. This may especially be the case in concentrated sectors such as chemicals and in steel in which recent M&A activity and legacy of foreign direct investment creates an environment in which multinational firms and their subsidiaries have access to trade remedies in multiple jurisdictions and the possibility of abusing them to segment markets.
The data on the crisis use of trade remedies also suggest that current protectionism, while limited, could quickly lead to escalating protectionism through at least three possible channels. The first of these is simple tit-for-tat retaliation. The second occurs after one country imposes a trade remedy on a product, and a second, third, fourth (etc.) country follow up by using their own import restrictions to target the same products due to the fear of a "trade deflection" surge of exports of the product into its own market. Finally, a newly imposed upstream trade barrier on imported inputs raises the cost to downstream users, creating competitiveness concerns that can generate additional downstream industry demands for cascading protectionism. The possibility that the major G-20 economies are currently invoking policies that may increase the probability of a spiraling, 1930s-style resort to Great Depression protectionism is therefore still a primary concern during the global crisis.
Introduction
WTO member countries turn to import-restricting "trade remedy" instruments during both good and bad macroeconomic times. Nevertheless, the historical economic evidence finds a strong link between economic downturns associated with recessions and exchange rate shocks and an increase in use of policies such as antidumping and safeguards. The sudden onset and global nature of the current economic crisis has created concern that countries may dramatically increase their use of such trade remedy instruments beyond the "normal" underlying current of protectionism associated with the ongoing process of adjustment associated with the forces of globalization. A number of countries have resorted to these instruments, including almost all of the Group of Twenty (G-20) that are members of the WTO. These countries have few alternatives for invoking new forms of potentially WTO-consistent import protection as many are constrained both by the rules of the international system and because their pre-crisis applied tariff rates may have been somewhat close to their tariff bindings legally submitted to the WTO. The use of these import-restricting instruments is increasingly affecting "South-South" trade, i.e., developing country importers initiating and imposing new protectionist measures primarily affecting developing country exporters. The majority of the product-level actions to limit import competition intensively target exports from China.
While the level of trade affected thus far may be small for most of these economies, in section 3 we make a first assessment of some of the case-level data and identify many possible ways in which the crisis use of these import-restricting trade remedies may have economically important welfaredistorting effects. These potential losses go beyond the first order concern of the size of lost imports associated with targeted products and the losses to domestic consumers and using industries that suffer due to reduced access to imported varieties and higher prices. An established body of economic research identifies a number of unintended and adverse consequences associated with national resort to these trade remedies. We use this literature to guide our more detailed investigation of individual cases.
We provide examples from crisis period cases in which firms may be using such remedies to generate anti-competitive effects imposing an additional burden on consumers. This may especially be the case in concentrated sectors such as chemicals and in steel in which recent M&A activity and legacy of foreign direct investment creates an environment in which multinational firms and their subsidiaries have access to trade remedies in multiple jurisdictions and the possibility of abusing them to segment markets.
Monitoring the Combined Use of Trade Remedies
Economic evidence from historical data (e.g., Knetter and Prusa, 2003; Irwin, 2005) finds a strong link between an increase in use of trade remedies during economic downturns associated with recessions and exchange rate shocks The effort to track, assess, and examine the impact of the spread of protectionism during the current global economic crisis is complicated. First, the use of "traditional" trade remedy instruments of antidumping (AD) and global safeguards (SG) has spread to new countries. 1 Second, many countries are also adopting and implementing use of other "new" trade remedy instruments such as China-specific transitional safeguards (CSG) and countervailing duties (CVD) under "anti-subsidy" laws. 2 Of the four policy instruments that we include in our analysis, the CSG is the least well known because of its relatively recent arrival on the scene -it is an instrument to which WTO members negotiated access beginning in 2001 as part of China's agreement to accede to the WTO, and it remains in place as a potential import-restricting policy instrument through 2014. The other lesser known and historically lesser-utilized instrument is the CVD policy. There may be some cause for speculation of a global shift toward increased use of this particular anti-subsidy instrument associated both with increased pressure relating to exports from China, as well as the current spread of the use of subsidies in government stimulus packages in light of the global economic crisis.
3 Therefore, while we are interested in tracking the combined use of these relatively substitutable forms of import protection especially in light of the global economic crisis, doing so requires more than simply additively aggregating their use. Some of these trade remedy instruments apply to specific foreign countries while others are applied on a more nondiscriminatory, most-favored-nation (MFN) basis across foreign sources. 4 In the presence of multiple trade remedy instruments which can be "substitutes" providing the same access to import protection, one way to normalize the data to assess the frequency of their combined use over time is to examine non-redundant requests for new protection undertaken within a policy-implementing economy at the product level. 5 For example, such an approach does make a country's use of AD or CVD targeting multiple foreign sources of the same imported product more comparable to global safeguard (SG) protection. This is the approach we adopt in sections 2.1 through 2.5, before then examining in section 2.6 the collective size of the imports likely to be affected by the use of these trade remedy instruments.
3 The first reason is the increasingly prominent role of China's exports in the world trading system and the fact that, unrelated to the financial crisis, the U.S. changed a 23 year old policy in March 2007 when the Department of Commerce indicated it would now "consider" industry petitions for import protection under the nation's countervailing duty initiations against China. As one of the pivotal players in the rules-based WTO system, the signal that the U.S. sent by initiating CVD use against China may spur other WTO member countries to adopt a similar approach. The second reason is due to the massive subsidies that major economies are currently imposing as part of their stimulus packages to deal with the global economic crisis. Some trading partners may seek to use CVDs to address what they perceive as trade-distorting effects of such subsidies. 4 In principle these trade remedy instruments do require different forms of evidence before they can be applied. AD requires evidence of less-than fair value pricing (dumping) and injury to the domestic industry from the dumped imports; CVD requires evidence of foreign subsidization and injury, SG requires evidence of injury caused by increasing imports, and CSG requires evidence of injury caused by increasing imports from China. Nevertheless, economic research such as Bown (2004) and Bown and McCulloch (2003) has shown that these instruments can be applied in ways that have similar effects on trade flows. 5 For example, by an initiation or measure being defined at the product level, we mean that the U.S.'s two 2Q 2008 antidumping investigation of "Certain circular welded carbon quality steel line pipe" from Korea and from China are treated as one product-level investigation. Furthermore, to ensure product-level initiations are not redundant across policy instruments, a WTO member's simultaneous AD and CVD cases over the same product are treated as one case. For example, the U.S.'s 2Q 2008 simultaneous AD and CVD investigations of "Certain circular welded carbon quality steel line pipe" from China are also treated as one product-level investigation.
In the next section we begin our discussion of the combined use of these trade remedies. For readers interested in tracking the trends in the underlying data on a policy-by-policy basis, appendix figures A through D present information on the initiations and measures imposed of each of the four distinctive trade remedy instruments over time.
The increase in trade remedy use during the crisis
As figure 
The countries that are using the trade remedies to limit imports
In addition to documenting the time trend of trade remedy use, figures 1a and 1b also illustrate the relative frequency with which these actions are being taken by developed versus developing economy users of import protectionist instruments. The figures indicate that increasingly these actions are being undertaken by developing countries. Table 1 European Union (7 per cent).
[ Table 1 here] during the crisis is not surprising. Nevertheless, the recurrence of use in these sectors, and the possibility of abuse on anti-competitive grounds is a potential cause for concern and additional inquiry and is an issue to which we will return in more detail in section 3 below.
The targeted sectors
[ Table 2 here]
Developing country firms have also initiated a number of new requests for import protection under trade remedy instruments since 1Q 2008 in the steel, chemicals, and machinery sectors (44 per cent of total developing country initiations). The other two sectors with a high number of new investigations in developing countries are textiles and apparel and plastics and rubber, which combine for another 27 per cent of the total developing economy activity under these instruments during the crisis. Table 3 illustrates the frequency with which exporters in various countries have been targeted by country-specific trade remedy instruments such as AD, CVD and CSG. Given the economies that are using these trade policies and the sectors that are being targeted for new import restrictions, it is not surprising that the exporters targeted by these actions are primarily located in other developing countries. The frequency with which developing countries as a whole have been targeted in countryspecific trade remedy investigations is 72 per cent during the crisis period of 2008 through 1Q 2009, which is a slight increase from 68 per cent in 2007.
The targeted exporters
[ Table 3 here]
China as the export target
The use of country-specific trade remedy instruments such as AD, CVD and CSG documented in table 3 also illustrates the intensity with which these using countries are targeting exports from China. One important question is whether the global crisis increases the intensity of use of these instruments against China's exporters relative to exporters in other WTO member countries. Will the phenomenon of using trade remedies to target China create additional political pressure within China either to increase its own use of trade remedies (perhaps as a response partially-motivated by retaliation), or to take a more active role in the WTO to attempt to slow down the use of these instruments (perhaps through formal dispute settlement, where it has been thus far slow to engage).
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Finally, figure 2 illustrates the relative frequency with which trade remedy-using countries are targeting China's various export sectors with newly initiated investigations. There are a number of Chinese exporting industries facing newly initiated investigations during this period -including chemicals, iron and steel, machinery, and textiles. We return to a more detailed discussion of the same 7 Of the 35 product-level newly initiated investigations in the 1Q 2009, six did not name any exporting countries because they were global safeguards, and China initiated two investigations itself.
Chinese export products being targeted in different foreign markets in our more detailed discussion of some of the underlying cases in section 3 below.
[ Figure 2 here]
The size of the imports under attack from the use of such trade remedies
Here we provide a first attempt to assess the size of the potential economic problem these potential trade remedies pose. I.e., how much trade is coming under attack from the increasing resort to trade remedies? Table 4 China as a share of the country's total imports from China. We construct this table for 12 of the largest WTO economies and users of these trade remedy instruments -four developed and eight developing countries.
[ Table 4 The data for some of the developing economy users of these trade remedies is a bit more worrisome. India, the most frequent user of these trade remedies (table 1) , is estimated to have $3.9
9 The 2007 imports are the last year for which the data is systematically available across all of these countries. 
Questions raised by the early data on use during the crisis
Even if the overall level of imports affected by the increasing use of these trade remedies during the crisis is not currently large, economists have a long established line of research identifying many channels through which the use of these policy instruments can generate unintended consequences with costly implications for economic welfare. In this section we use this economic research to guide our investigation of underlying cases that constitute potentially worrisome examples of resort to trade remedies during the crisis.
Crisis protectionism leading to escalading protectionism?: Tit-for-tar retaliation, trade deflection, and cascading protectionism
In this section we explore three channels through which current resort to trade remedy protectionism during the global crisis creates incentives for follow-on use by others of trade remedies and the possibly worrisome escalation of protectionism. To begin this exercise, we examine the use of trade remedies across countries over "common products" listed in table 5. The table presents 35 instances in which more than one policy imposing country initiated a trade remedy investigation over the same 6-digit HS product(s) during the period covered by 1Q 2007 through 1Q2009. These 35 product examples cover more than 70 unique 6-digit HS codes. The table presents the name of the product, the 6-digit HS product(s) common to the investigating countries, the names of the countries undertaking the common investigations, as well as the name of targeted exporters associated with each investigation. The product list is organized numerically by the underlying HS codes.
[ Table 5 here]
The first channel is that firms may use a policy like antidumping to discipline foreign rivals in direct tit-for-tar retaliatory actions. While it is relatively rare for two economies to target one another Of course it is also not necessary for retaliation (i.e., the current trade remedy provoking use of future protectionism) to be limited to only instances in which countries import and export the same product. One country's excessive reliance on the use of trade remedies can lead to its exporters becoming foreign targets in other products in the same industry, or in other industries altogether, thus expanding the potential escalation of protectionism. 13 This is of particular concern given the current economic crisis and the desire to avoid repeating the spiral of protectionism associated with the 1930s and the Great Depression era.
A second concern raised by the "Sodium metal" cases is that even if no antidumping measures are imposed, the two firms that would otherwise compete vigorously with each other in the U.S. and 13 Studies of the retaliatory links and incentives created under antidumping include Blonigen and Bown (2003) , Prusa and Skeath (2004) , and Feinberg and Reynolds (2006) .
EC markets (resulting in lower prices for consumers) may be able to use the AD process to reach an implicitly collusive agreement to less vigorously compete in each other's market (thus hurting consumers). We further explore possible anti-competitiveness effects to the use and abuse of trade remedies in section 3.2 below.
A second channel through which current protectionism may create incentives for future, additional protectionism is associated with the phenomenon of "trade deflection" Crowley 2006, 2007; Durling and Prusa, 2006) in which follow-on countries may resort to use of these trade policy instruments to prevent export surges of the same product to the first country's trade remedy as well as the frequency with which common exporters are being targeted across countries, suggests this may be a part of the explanation for these and future acts of protectionism in the data.
14
A third channel of current use of trade remedies creating additional incentives for future use is sometimes referred to as "cascading protectionism" (Hoekman and Leidy, 1992) . Another concern raised by the table 5 list of products is the number of measures likely to affect intermediate inputs.
Imposing new trade barriers on inputs can adversely affect downstream producers by increasing their costs, thus decreasing their competitiveness in the global marketplace with other foreign suppliers that do not face such additional costs. 15 One important example from table 5 is found in products 12 through 16, which are various forms of yarns and fibres that are crucial inputs into the production of textiles and apparel, an important source of industrial output and exports for many developing countries.
Interestingly, the countries that are imposing these new restrictions on yarn and fibres are Turkey, Peru, Argentina, South Africa, Brazil, and India. These developing economies are many of the same countries whose textile and apparel industries are already struggling to compete in global markets with China's textile and apparel exports. Using trade remedies to raise the cost of an integral input is likely to have unintended and yet important downstream competitiveness consequences, including increasing the probability that these developing economies' textile and apparel producers may themselves be the next in line demanding their own protectionism through trade remedies.
Antidumping, multinational firms, and potential concerns of anti-competitive behavior
There are a number of additional worries when it comes to the use of policies such as antidumping.
Firms may abuse the policy by convincing government policymakers to impose trade barriers that, while in the firms' interest, are not in the overall interest of the country. There are a number of mechanisms through which firms may manipulate such policies -including by using it as a tool to get government policymakers to assist (perhaps unwittingly) firms to segment markets (raising anticompetitiveness concerns), and as a tool to raise domestic rivals costs. The potential for abuse is increasingly heightened when the key industrial users of the policies are multinational firms with headquarters and subsidiaries situated globally that have the ability to tap into (and to be affected by)
trade remedies in many different political jurisdictions. would voluntarily agree to raise prices and for a given downward-sloping import demand curve, by extension, reduce export volumes. One of the Chinese firms agreeing to the new price undertaking was 16 Important contributions to the economic research literature on the ways in which access to antidumping can inadvertently increase the concern for anti-competitive behavior include Prusa (1992) , Messerlin (1992) , and Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999) . 17 See http://www.dupontteijinfilms.com .
Osram China Lighting Co. Ltd., a subsidiary of Osram, which is a German-headquartered firm. This is particularly interesting given that one of the domestic petitioning firms was Osram India Pvt. Ltd., the Indian subsidiary of the same German-headquartered parent Osram. 18 Thus this is an example of one subsidiary targeting another subsidiary with a new trade restriction that could also have the anticompetitive effect of segmenting markets.
As a second channel through which multinational firms and foreign direct investment may have distorting effects on the use of trade remedies, consider a situation in which the imposition of import protection in the past created incentives for firms to expand the reach of their multinational operations and "tariff jump" to avoid trade barriers by creating local producers that would not be subject to future import restrictions. from China. In none of these cases did the trade remedies target imports from India, despite Indian exporters being a major competitive producer of steel globally.
With respect to India's own use of new import restrictions over steel during the crisis, the global M&A activity by Indian steel firms also has the potential to shape which foreign targets are While these examples are surely not conclusive evidence of anti-competitive behavior, given the scope for abuse of antidumping and other trade remedy provisions, these and other AD investigations should be closely monitored. One serious concern is that firms will use the cover of the global economic crisis to stoke protectionist sentiment and these trade remedies will inadvertently be applied by government policymakers in a way that reduces competitiveness conditions. This has the potential for far-reaching and longer-lasting effects than the costs imposed on consumers and consuming industries associate with the "mere" imposition of trade restrictions.
Policy Implications and Conclusions
The global economic crisis has been accompanied by an increase in the global use of import-restricting trade remedies as a protectionist response. While the data suggests that there has been an increase, the scale of the use of these particular policy instruments has been limited. The most intensive use has been in developing countries, and the biggest and most worrisome user being India. The export targets of the new protectionism are increasingly concentrated in other developing countries, and the intensity of use against China's exporters is also of concern for the longevity and sustainability of the trading system.
While the scale of the problem associated with the use of trade remedies during the crisis thus far is not massive, there are a number of worrisome in trends in how it is being use to suggest that future use may also increase, due to retaliation, the response to trade deflection concerns, and cascading protectionism to downstream industries. The use of antidumping during the crisis in sectors with substantial recent M&A activity also stokes concerns of potential abuse and anti-competiveness concerns that firms may be using these policies in their attempts to segment markets.
The first lesson for policymakers stemming from this data and from decades of economic research into the effects of these policies is to hold the line. To the greatest extent possible, 19 Even antidumping itself may create incentives for firms to engage in FDI in order to avoid future application of such trade restrictions. For evidence, see Belderbos (1997) and Blonigen (2001) . 20 However, Jindal Stainless Limited does report on its website subsidiaries in the UK (Jindal Stainless UK Limited, London) and Italy (Jindal Stainless Italy S.r.l. ), see http://www.jindalstainless.com/subsidiarycompanies.html , last accessed on 10 June.
policymakers should refuse new requests to implement such acts of import protection through trade remedies.
However, if it is not possible to dismiss all the requests for protection, economists have a duty to advise policymakers on how to impose any new trade barriers in a means that are least distortive and costly (in terms of economic efficiency) lasting for as short a period as possible. If policymakers must resort to use of trade remedies amidst political pressure during the economic crisis, there a number of reasons to strongly encourage the protectionism be fitted into using the global safeguards (SG) instrument and not the other country-specific instruments like AD, CVD or the CSG.
First, the WTO rules require SG protection must be applied on a nondiscriminatory (MFN) basis, which is more likely to prevent potentially costly trade diversion than trade remedies imposed in the form of AD, CVD or CSG. The imposition of an import restriction on, say, China alone may impose other efficiency costs if it just creates incentives for domestic consumers to switch their sourcing to other higher cost foreign suppliers that are not subject to the trade restriction. While a SG does still raise the price facing consumers and thus impose a cost on the economy, an efficiency "benefit" to the policy is that it does not sever the link between any remaining imports and the identity of the most efficient foreign source of those imports.
Second, the WTO's SG provisions have a built-in time process for scaling back and ultimately eliminating the protection over time. This is important during the global crisis as the speed with which countries are able to extricate themselves from their economic downturns is likely affected by their impediments to growth, which would include the imposition of new trade barriers taken on during the crisis. Historically, SG-imposing countries have been much more likely to remove the protectionism than has been the case for AD or CVD. And as table 6 indicates, it is unlike that adversely affected exporters will be able to resort to the WTO's dispute settlement provisions anytime soon to deal with the problem of getting potentially WTO-inconsistent AD or CVD measures removed. The table shows that the developing country exporters that are the main target of the current use of these trade remedies during the crisis have challenged less than 5 per cent (38 out of 909) of the imposed measures through formal WTO dispute settlement. Thus it is better that such policies not be imposed in the first place, but that a global safeguard with a built-in phase-out mechanism, be used instead.
[ Table 6 here]
The third and fourth reasons to prefer SG are more subtle but nevertheless still important.
Because global safeguards are "fair trade" provisions, they are less adversarial to foreigners. Unlike AD or CVD, using SG does not require an allegation of foreign wrongdoing (dumping or illegal subsidies). Instead, SG entails greater recognition and acceptance that the act of protectionism is a response to a crisis. Using SG over AD/CVD may thus decrease the likelihood of foreign retaliation and the ramping-up of protectionist sentiment in trading partners. As a final technical matter, SG is simply less costly for a bureaucracy to administer than policies such as AD and CVD, which are much more data intensive. Taking as given that the end of an investigation is simply going to result in protectionism, it seems wasteful for developing countries in particular to use scarce governmental resources administering the more complex form of what are similarly protectionist policies. 
SG Initiations

SG Measures
Sources: data in both panels taken from the WTO member reports to the Committee on Safeguards and comprehensively covers the full WTO membership. Source: Compiled by the author from the Global Antidumping Database. These are non-redundant AD, CVD, SG, CSG at the product level. 
